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ABSTRACT 
We analyze the interaction between the soft budget constraint (SBC) and international trade 
by placing Segal’s (1998) SBC model within Melitz’s (2003) framework of international trade 
with heterogeneous monopolistically competitive firms. As in Segal’s model, SBC may result in 
moral hazard. The opening to international trade adds another sort of inefficiency. Some firms 
that would have become exporters in the absence of SBC choose to apply low effort and not 
export in order to extract a subsidy from the government. This effect takes place when the trade 
costs are sufficiently low. Overall, however, trade liberalization reduces inefficiencies generated 
by SBC. The number of firms subject to moral hazard SBC decreases, aggregate effort level 
increases and aggregate profits lost due to SBC-induced sub-optimal effort decline as trade costs 
decrease. 
 
JEL Classification: F12, D21, H25 
Keywords: Soft budget constraint, international trade, heterogeneous firms, monopolistic 
competition 
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Trade Liberalization, Heterogeneous Firms and the Soft Budget Constraint 
 
1. Introduction 
A firm’s budget constraint is said to be “soft” if an unprofitable firm can count on being 
bailed out by the state.1 The term Soft Budget Constraint (SBC) initially referred to enterprises in 
centrally planned economies (see Kornai, 1979, 1980). Since then, however, the SBC concept 
has received much wider attention in economics literature (see surveys by Maskin and Xu, 2001, 
and Kornai et al., 2003). While SBC has been most often observed in the socialist economies, the 
economies in transition, and developing countries, it has recently become highly relevant to 
established market economies, including the U.S. where the federal government has bailed out 
several financial firms and  two major automobile manufacturers.  
One important issue in the SBC literature has been the determination of factors that weaken 
government incentives to bail out insolvent firms. For example, Dewatripont and Maskin (1995) 
and Alexeev and Kim (2004) showed that decentralized lending market hardens budget 
constraints. Also, Segal (1998) showed that while government subsidy can be a subgame perfect 
equilibrium in a game between the benevolent government and a monopoly, competition among 
homogeneous firms could eliminate SBC under certain conditions. In this paper we consider a 
market with monopolistically competitive firms and examine the effect of trade liberalization on 
SBC. Our setup incorporates the main elements of Segal’s model within Melitz’s (2003) 
framework of international trade. In Segal’s benchmark model, the possibility of receiving a 
subsidy creates a moral hazard for a monopoly that may decide to apply lower than socially 
optimal effort in order to make it sub-game optimal for the government to provide the subsidy. In 
                                                            
1 This rather loose definition is taken from Segal (1998).  
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our model, the firms are monopolistic competitors with heterogeneous productivities. Thus, ours 
is the first SBC model that incorporates both moral hazard and heterogeneous firms in a 
monopolistically competitive environment. In addition, this is the first model that analyzes the 
relationships between SBC and international trade, including the firm’s propensity to export.  
We find that if trade costs are sufficiently low, SBC eliminates incentives to export among 
some firms that would have exported in the absence of SBC. Perhaps more importantly, we show 
that for any trade costs level, trade liberalization reduces SBC-induces inefficiencies in the 
economy. The main inefficiency arises because some firms subject to SBC apply less than 
socially optimal effort. We show that this loss declines in trade costs. In addition, we show that 
social loss measured as the amount of profits lost by the firms due to lower effort also decreases 
in trade costs. Finally, we demonstrate that the inefficiency resulting from loss-making firms 
being kept afloat by government subsidies diminishes as trade costs decline. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we set up the basic model with 
heterogeneous firms’ moral hazard in monopolistic competition under autarky. In Section 3 we 
extend the basic model to the open economy, and analyze the effects of lower trade costs on SBC. 
Section 4 concludes.  
 
2. A model of SBC under Monopolistic Competition and Autarky  
2.1.Demand 
Consider an economy populated by homogeneous consumers and heterogeneous firms. A 
representative consumer has income I and CES preferences over a set of differentiated goods 
indexed by ݔ ∈ ܺ,where X is a set of all potentially available goods. Consumer income consists 
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of wages normalized to 1 paid for inelastically supplied labor, L, and firm profits, ߨ, which are 
equally distributed among all consumers. Consumer optimization problem is: 
max௤ሺ௫ሻ ܷ ൌ 	 ቈන ݍሺݔሻఘ݀ݔ௫∈௑ ቉
ଵ
ఘ
	, 0 ൏ ߩ ൏ 1							ሺ1ሻ 
ݏ. ݐ. න ݌ሺݔሻݍሺݔሻ݀ݔ
௫∈௑
ൌ ܫ	 ൌ ܮ ൅ ߨ																																								ሺ2ሻ 
where ݍሺݔሻ is the demand for good x, ݌ሺݔሻ is the price of x, ߪ is the elasticity of substitution 
between any two goods with ߪ ൐ 1 and ൌ ఙିଵఙ  . We define the aggregate price index	ܲ as 
ܲ ൌ ቈන ݌ሺݔሻଵିఙ݀ݔ
௫∈௑
቉
ଵ
ଵିఙ
																												ሺ3ሻ 
The demand for good x is derived from the consumer maximization problem: 
ݍሺݔሻ ൌ ൬ܫܲ൰ ൤
݌ሺݔሻ
ܲ ൨
ିఙ
												ሺ4ሻ 
and the price elasticity of demand is: 
ߝ௣ ൌ െ݀ݍ݀݌
݌
ݍ ൌ ߪ																																																ሺ5ሻ 
2.2.Production 
We consider a monopolistically competitive market consisting of N firms (not all of which 
choose to operate) in which each firm produces a different good (variety) ݔ using increasing 
returns technology defined in (6) below via the cost function. The only factors of production are 
labor and “effort.” A firm chooses its effort level a (1 ൑ ܽ ൑ ܣሻ  after entry to reduce its 
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marginal cost, MC. Following Segal (1998), we assume that the firm incurs no cost for its effort, 
and only the firm knows its effort level, so that no contracts based on the level of effort are 
possible.2  
Firm’s effort reduces MC in a multiplicative fashion, and the total cost for each firm applying 
effort a is given by: 
ܶܥሺߠ, ܽሻ ൌ ݂ ൅ ൤ 1ߠܽ൨ ݍ						ሺ6ሻ 
where ݂ ൐ 0 is fixed cost of production which is the same for all firms.3 After finding out its 
productivity ߠ ൒ 1  the firm decides whether to produce or not. We assume that the firm’s 
“effort-inclusive” productivity aθ is observable.  
Each firm draws its productivity from a Pareto distribution with the cumulative distribution 
function: 
ܨሺߠሻ ൌ 1 െ ߠିఊ, ߛ ൐ ܯܽݔሼ1, ߪ െ 1ሽ							ሺ7ሻ 
(The assumption that ߛ ൐ ܯܽݔሼ1, ߪ െ 1ሽ	 assures that in equilibrium the size distribution of 
firms has a finite mean.)  
      The firm’s profit maximization problem is: 
max௣ ߨሺߠ, ܽሻ ൌ ݌ݍ െ
1
ߠܽ ݍ െ ݂,																									ሺ8ሻ 
ݏݑܾ݆݁ܿݐ	ݐ݋	ߨሺ∙ሻ ൒ 0	 
                                                            
2 Note that a can denote some other type of investment that reduces marginal cost of production. The assumption 
that effort is costless simplifies exposition while producing particularly stark results. The qualitative nature of the 
results would not change if effort were assumed to be costly.  
3 One can argue that firms subject to SBC often have higher fixed costs than other firms. As we discuss later, the 
assumption of identical fixed costs is easily relaxed. 
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implying that  the equilibrium price, output and profit of each firm are, respectively: 
݌ሺߠ, ܽሻ ൌ 1ߩߠܽ																								ሺ9ሻ 
ݍሺߠ, ܽሻ ൌ ܫܲఙିଵሺߩߠܽሻఙ						ሺ10ሻ 
ߨሺߠ, ܽሻ ൌ 	 ܫሺߩߠܽܲሻ
ఙିଵ
ߪ െ ݂																		ሺ11ሻ 
Clearly, without subsidies, every firm that chooses to operate will apply maximum effort, A, 
because ߨሺߠ, ܣሻ ൐ ߨሺߠ, ܽሻ for all a < A. Also, there is a cut-off level ̅ߠ஺ of productivity which 
satisfies	ߨሺ̅ߠ஺, ܽሻ ൌ 0 implying that ̅ߠ஺ is: 
̅ߠ஺ ൌ 1ߩܣܲ ൬
݂ߪ
ܫ ൰
ଵ
ఙିଵ 						ሺ12ሻ 
A firm with productivity  ߠ ൏ ̅ߠ஺ will decide not to produce while a firm with ߠ ൒ ̅ߠ஺ will 
operate. Recalling that the measure of firms that can potentially operate is N and using (7), (9), 
and (12), we can obtain the aggregate price index: 
ܲ ൌ ቆܰන ݌ሺߠ, ܣሻଵିఙ݀ܨሺߠሻ
ஶ
ఏഥಲ
ቇ
ଵ
ଵିఙ ൌ ቆܰන ൬ 1ߩߠܣ൰
ଵିఙ
ߛߠିఊିଵ݀ߠ
ஶ
ఏഥಲ
ቇ
ଵ
ଵିఙ
 
⟹ ܲ ൌ ܲሺ̅ߠ஺ሻ ൌ
ۉ
ۇ ߛ െ ሺߪ െ 1ሻ
൬ሺߪ െ 1ሻܣߪ ൰
ఙିଵ
ܰߛሺ̅ߠ஺ሻఙିଵିఊی
ۊ
ଵ
ఙିଵ
	 
⟹ ܲ ൌ ൮ ߣ
ܰߛሺߩܣሻߛ ቀߪ݂ܫ ቁ
ߚ൲
1
ߛ
								ሺ13ሻ 
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where β = 1 െ ఊఙିଵ , ߣ ൌ ߛ െ ሺߪ െ 1ሻ.  
2.3.Introduction of Government Subsidy 
Following Dewatripont and Maskin (1995) and Segal (1998) we view SBC as a result of 
government’s inability to precommit to not subsidizing a firm that would go out of business 
without the subsidy, but would continue operating with the subsidy. Suppose that a benevolent 
government decides to support a subset of firms by providing a subsidy, ݏ ൐ 0, if the firms are 
going to exit the market without such support.4 We assume that only relatively few of the total 
number of firms, specifically, Ns << N firms, might be eligible for government support, so that 
the choices of these firms do not significantly affect the aggregate price index and aggregate 
profit in the economy.5 These might be firms in particular industries that the government deems 
worthy of subsidizing if they are on the verge of exiting. The distribution of productivities of 
these firms is assumed to be the same as for all firms. In the rest of the paper, we will refer to 
these firms either as “eligible for subsidy” or as “potentially SBC firms.” In principle, we do not 
need to separate firms eligible for subsidy from other firms. All we need for our model to remain 
tractable and for our results to hold is that the aggregate price index and profit are 
(approximately) independent of the number of subsidized firms. We also assume that the 
                                                            
4 In Segal (1998) the size of the subsidy is endogenous and is determined based on consumer surplus generated by 
the subsidized firm and the government’s cost of raising funds. In order to keep our model tractable, we make the 
subsidy exogenous. However, the subsidy is provided only if the firm can credibly threaten to go out of business 
unless the subsidy is given. 
5 As will be seen later, the presence of the subsidy to some firms implies that some firms with productivities below 
̅ߠ஺ would choose to operate and also some of the firms with productivities above ̅ߠ஺ would not apply maximum 
amount of effort. If there were many such firms, they would affect the aggregate price index and the aggregate profit 
in the economy, The change in the price index due to non-maximum effort by firms makes the problem intractable. 
The changes in the aggregate profit and price index due to the presence of firms that would not have operated at all 
without a subsidy makes already complicated calculations substantially more tedious, but does not affect the results 
as long as these low productivity firms do not affect the difference between profits and price indices under autarky 
and in the open economy. A similar assumption of the negligible effect of part of the economy on the aggregate 
price index is present, for example, in Chaney (2005) and in Do and Levchenko (2009). 
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government obtains funds for its expenditures, including the subsidy from taxing labor income, 
so that consumer income I introduced above is after-tax income.6 In addition, we assume that  
																																																										0 ൑ ݏ ൏ ݂																																																									ሺ14ሻ 
As Segal (1998) showed, even though effort is costless, the possibility of obtaining a subsidy 
might induce some firms not to exert maximum possible effort. This happens because low effort 
can serve as a precommitment to not producing without a subsidy. After a firm that is in 
principle eligible for a subsidy enters the market and observes its productivity ߠ, it bargains with 
the government for the subsidy via a game with the following timing: 
- Stage 1: The firm chooses its effort level a. 
- Stage 2: The firm asks the government for subsidy, s, threatening to stop production 
without s. 
- Stage 3: The government, observing the firm’s effort-inclusive productivity aθ (but 
neither θ nor a separately) decides whether to accept or reject the firm’s offer. 
- Stage 4: If the offer is accepted, the firm obtains the subsidy and produces at its profit 
maximizing level, given its productivity ߠ  and effort a. Otherwise, the firm decides 
whether to produce or not. 
By considering firms’ heterogeneous productivity and the game above simultaneously, we 
obtain the following three propositions which describe the relationship between SBC and the 
                                                            
6 We assume that if subsidy amounts change, the government offsets these changes by changing its other 
expenditures on items that do not directly affect production such as improving environment or providing foreign aid. 
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productivity distribution of firms in the market.7 (All proofs are presented in the Appendix). 
Proposition 1: For  
ߠ ൒ 	 ̅ߠଵ ൌ ଵఘ௉ ቀ
௙ఙ
ூ ቁ
భ
഑షభ,  (15) 
firms choose the maximum effort A without asking for a subsidy (i.e., firms have a hard budget 
constraint, HBC). 
Proposition 2 (Segal, 1998):  For a firm with ̅ߠ஺ ൑ ߠ ൏ ̅ߠଵ ,  
i) If ߨሺߠ, ܣሻ ൏ ݏ , the firm chooses the cut-off level of effort ܽ଴ሺ൏ ܣሻ, receives the 
subsidy ݏ and produces (Moral hazard SBC); 
ii) If ߨሺߠ, ܣሻ ൐ ݏ, the firm chooses maximum effort A, receives no subsidy and produces 
(HBC); 
iii) If ߨሺߠ, ܣሻ ൌ ݏ, the result would be either  i) or ii). 
In Proposition 2, some firms with productivity ߠ	ϵ	ሾ̅ߠ஺, ̅ߠଵሻ do not apply maximum effort in order 
to obtain the subsidy from the government, implying the existence of moral hazard. 
Proposition 3:  For a firm with ߠ ൏ ̅ߠ஺, 
i) If ߨሺߠ, ܣሻ ൅ ݏ ൒ 0, the firm chooses maximum effort ܣ, receives a subsidy of ݏ, and 
produces (Non-moral hazard SBC). 
ii) If ߨሺߠ, ܣሻ ൅ ݏ ൏ 0, the firm exits the market (HBC). 
                                                            
7 As noted earlier. because we assume that relatively few firms are eligible for a subsidy, we are using the same 
price index as in the case without government subsidies calculated in expression (13) and, in particular, this price 
index integrates over all firms with productivites starting from ߠതܣ rather than from the threshold for the firms that 
are eligible for a subsidy. As shown below, this latter threshold, ߠതܰ, is lower than ߠതܣ, implying that strictly speaking 
the price index should have been ܲ ൌ ൬ ௦ܰ ׬ ቀ ଵఘఏ஺ቁ
ଵିఙ ߛߠିఊିଵ݀ߠ ൅ఏഥಲఏഥಿ ܰ ׬ ቀ
ଵ
ఘఏ஺ቁ
ଵିఙ ߛߠିఊିଵ݀ߠஶఏഥಲ ൰
భ
భష഑
.  
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In Proposition 3 some firms with ߠ ൏ ̅ߠ஺ exert maximum effort A and receive the subsidy to keep 
operating. So there is SBC, but no moral hazard is present. 
2.4.Cut-off Levels of Productivity for Moral Hazard SBC and Non-moral Hazard SBC 
Proposition 2 implies the existence of a cut-off level of productivity that determines whether 
a firm has moral hazard SBC or HBC. For ߠ	ϵ	ሾ̅ߠ஺, ̅ߠଵሻ	 there exists ̅ߠெ	such that if a firm’s 
productivity is greater than ̅ߠெ, then it will have HBC. Otherwise, a firm will have moral hazard 
SBC. This cut-off level is found from the condition ሺ̅ߠெ, ܣሻ ൌ ߨሺ̅ߠெ, ܽ଴ሻ ൅ ݏ ൌ ݏ :  
̅ߠெ ൌ 1ߩܣܲ ൤
ߪሺ݂ ൅ ݏሻ
ܫ ൨
ଵ
ఙିଵ 						ሺ16ሻ 
Similarly, Proposition 3 implicitly defines the cut-off level of productivity ̅ߠே that determines 
whether the firm has non-moral hazard SBC or HBC (exit the market). This cut-off level is such 
that  ߨሺ̅ߠே, ܣሻ ൅ ݏ	= 0: 
̅ߠே ൌ 1ߩܣܲ ቈ
ߪሺ݂ െ ݏሻ
ܫ ቉
ଵ
ఙିଵ 						ሺ17ሻ 
Since we assume that f > s, ̅ߠே is greater than zero. If a firm’s productivity is within  (̅ߠே, ̅ߠ஺,), it 
will have non-moral hazard SBC. If ߠ ≤ ̅ߠே, a firm will have HBC and exit the market. 
Some may argue that SBC usually characterizes large (“too big to fail”) firms while in our 
model with uniform fixed costs, only firms with medium-level productivity and, therefore, 
medium-level output are subject to SBC. Note, however, that both productivity and output level 
of firms that choose to remain in business depends on their fixed costs. As is clear from (12) and 
(16), if we assume that SBC firms have significantly greater fixed costs than do non-SBC-
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eligible firms, then firms subject to SBC can be of arbitrarily large size measured by their output. 
Moreover, the fact that SBC firms have relatively high fixed costs accords nicely with common 
perception (e.g., large formerly state-owned firms in the economies in transition or Chaebols in 
Korea prior to the financial crisis of 1997-1998). At the same time, the assumption that SBC-
eligible firms have higher fixed costs than other firms does not affect any of our results either 
above or below. The same is true with respect to the model with trade, i.e., our results are not 
altered if SBC firms have higher export-related fixed costs than other firms. 
So far we have defined four threshold levels of productivity,	̅ߠଵ, ̅ߠ஺, ̅ߠெ, and ̅ߠே in Eqs. (15), 
(12), (16), and (17), respectively. Because 0 ൏ ݏ ൏ ݂, the ordering of the these cut-off levels is 
0 ൏ ̅ߠே ൏ ̅ߠ஺ ൏ ̅ߠெ ൏ ̅ߠଵ. 8. In sum, if the government is willing to provide a subsidy to some 
firms, the least productive of SBC-eligible firms with ߠ ൏ ̅ߠே will have HBC and choose not to 
produce, firms with ̅ߠே ൑ ߠ ൏ ̅ߠ஺  will have non-moral hazard SBC, intermediate productivity 
firms with ̅ߠ஺ ൑ ߠ ൏ ̅ߠெ will have moral hazard SBC, and finally, most productive firms with 
ߠ ൒ ̅ߠெ will have HBC. 
 
3. The Model with Trade  
Let the economy examined above engage in trade with another (foreign) economy that has 
the same parameters as the domestic economy except there is no SBC in the foreign country and 
that the home government does not subsidize foreign firms. When the home country opens its 
economy, some domestic firms start exporting to the foreign market and goods produced by 
                                                            
8 To obtain ̅ߠଵ ൐ ̅ߠெ, we need to show that ݏ ൏ ݂ሺܣఙିଵ െ 1ሻ. Since ሺܣఙିଵ െ 1ሻ ൐ 1 as both ܣ and ߪ are greater than 
1, and ݏ ൏ ݂, we obtain ݏ ൏ ݂ሺܣఙିଵ െ 1ሻ.    
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some foreign firms are imported. We describe the economy with trade below. As under autarky, 
domestic firms that are not eligible for government subsidies always apply maximum effort A. 
Firms that are potentially eligible for a subsidy might have an incentive to apply effort a < A and 
play essentially the same game with the government as they do under autarky. The only 
difference is that at Stage 4, firms make decisions not only about production, but also about 
whether to export. 
3.1.Production in the Domestic Market 
The equilibrium price, ݌ௗ , quantity, ݍௗ , and profit, πୢ , in the domestic market given the 
aggregate price index in the open economy,	 ்ܲ, and consumer income ܫ்	are as follows: 
݌ௗሺߠ, ܽሻ ൌ 1ߩߠܽ							ሺ18ሻ 
ݍௗሺߠ, ܽሻ ൌ ܫ் ்ܲఙିଵሺߩߠܽሻఙ						ሺ19ሻ 
ߨௗሺߠ, ܽሻ ൌ ܫ்ሺߩߠܽ ்ܲሻ
ఙିଵ
ߪ െ ݂						ሺ20ሻ 
From ߨௗሺߠ, ܣሻ ൌ 0, the cut-off level of productivity with maximum effort A in the domestic 
market is: 
̅ߠௗ஺ ൌ 1ߩܣ ்ܲ ൬
݂ߪ
ܫ் ൰
ଵ
ఙିଵ 								ሺ21ሻ 
When a firm makes no effort, that is, a = 1, the cut-off level of productivity will be:  
̅ߠௗଵ ൌ 1ߩ ்ܲ ൬
݂ߪ
ܫ் ൰
ଵ
ఙିଵ 							ሺ22ሻ 
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For firms with ̅ߠௗ஺ ൑ ߠ ൏ ̅ߠௗଵ , their profits can be positive or negative, depending on their 
efforts, that is, πୢሺθ, 1ሻ ൏ 0 ൑ πୢሺθ, Aሻ. Hence there exists the cut-off level of effort ܽௗ଴  which 
satisfies ߨௗሺߠ, ܽௗ଴ሻ ൌ 0 as follows: 
ܽௗ଴ሺߠሻ ൌ 	 1ߩߠ ்ܲ ൬
݂ߪ
ܫ் ൰
ଵ
ఙିଵ 							ሺ23ሻ 
For firms with ̅ߠௗ஺ ൑ ߠ ൏ 	 ̅ߠௗଵ we obtain the cut-off level of productivity for moral hazard SBC, 
̅ߠௗெ, in the domestic market such that ߨௗሺ̅ߠௗெ, ܣሻ ൌ ߨௗሺ̅ߠௗெ, ܽௗ଴ሻ ൅ ݏ ൌ ݏ: 
̅ߠௗெ ൌ 1ߩܣ ்ܲ ൤
ߪሺ݂ ൅ ݏሻ
ܫ் ൨
ଵ
ఙିଵ 						ሺ24ሻ 
For firms with ߠ ൏ ̅ߠௗ஺ there exists the cut-off level of productivity for non-moral hazard SBC 
such that ߨௗሺ̅ߠௗே, ܣሻ ൅ ݏ ൌ 0	: 
̅ߠௗே ൌ 1ߩܣ ்ܲ ቈ
ߪሺ݂ െ ݏሻ
ܫ் ቉
ଵ
ఙିଵ 						ሺ25ሻ 
3.2. Exports 
As in Melitz (2003), we define two new parameters related to trade costs. First, let ߬ ൐ 1 be a 
per-unit iceberg costs for exporting such as transportation costs and tariffs. That is, exporters 
have to produce 	τ  units of the good to sell one unit in the foreign market. In addition, let ௫݂ be 
the fixed cost of exporting. We assume that ௫݂ ൐ ݂. With these two types of trade frictions the 
total cost of exporting quantity qx, ܶܥ௫ is: 
ܶܥ௫ሺߠሻ ൌ ௫݂ ൅ ቀ ߬ߠܽቁ ݍ௫	.					ሺ26ሻ 
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The firm’s objective function in the foreign market is: 
max௣ೣ 	ߨ௫ሺߠ, ܽሻ ൌ ݌௫ݍ௫ െ
߬
ߠܽ ݍ௫ െ ௫݂ 						ሺ27ሻ 
ݏݑܾ݆݁ܿݐ	ݐ݋	ߨ௫ሺ∙ሻ ൒ 0	 
From Eq. (27) we obtain the equilibrium price, quantity and profit for exporting as follows: 
݌௫ሺߠ, ܽሻ ൌ 	 ߬ߩߠܽ						ሺ28ሻ 
ݍ௫ሺߠ, ܽሻ ൌ ܫ் ்ܲఙିଵ ൬ߩߠܽ߬ ൰
ఙ
							ሺ29ሻ 
ߨ௫ሺߠ, ܽሻ ൌ ܫ்ߪ ൬
ߩߠܽ ்ܲ
߬ ൰
ఙିଵ
െ ௫݂					ሺ30ሻ 
From the condition 	ߨ௫ሺߠ, ܽሻ ൌ 0 the cut-off level of productivity for exporting with maximum 
effort A is: 
̅ߠ௫஺ ൌ ߬ߩܣ ்ܲ ൬
௫݂ߪ
ܫ் ൰
ଵ
ఙିଵ 						ሺ31ሻ 
With no effort the cut-off level of productivity for exporting will be ̅ߠ௫ଵ ൌ ఛఘ௉೅ ቀ
௙ೣ ఙ
ூ೅ ቁ
భ
഑షభ, and  
̅ߠ௫ଵ ൐ ̅ߠ௫஺ as ܣ ൐ 1. Hence a firm with θ ൒ ̅ߠ௫ଵ will export regardless of its effort, while a firm 
with ̅ߠ௫஺ ൑ ߠ ൏ ̅ߠ௫ଵ will be a potential exporter depending on its effort. A firm with θ ൏ ̅ߠ௫஺ 
never exports. Finally, since foreign firms have the same productivity thresholds for export to the 
home country, the aggregate price index in the open economy is: 
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்ܲ ൌ ቆܰන 	݌ௗሺߠ, ܣሻଵିఙ݀ܨሺߠሻ
ஶ
ఏഥ೏ಲ
൅ ܰන ݌௫ሺߠ, ܣሻଵିఙ݀ܨሺߠሻ
ஶ
ఏഥೣಲ
ቇ
ଵ
ଵିఙ
ൌ ቆܰන ൬ 1ߩߠܣ൰
ଵିఙ
ߛߠିఊିଵ݀ߠ
ஶ
ఏഥ೏ಲ
൅ ܰන ൬ ߬ߩߠܣ൰
ଵିఙ
ߛߠିఊିଵ݀ߠ
ஶ
ఏഥೣಲ
ቇ
ଵ
ଵିఙ
 
⟹ ்ܲ ൌ ்ܲሺ̅ߠௗ஺, ̅ߠ௫஺ሻ ൌ
ۉ
ۈ
ۇ ߛ െ ሺߪ െ 1ሻ
൬ሺߪ െ 1ሻܣߪ ൰
ఙିଵ
ߛܰ ቈሺ̅ߠௗ஺ሻఙିଵିఊ ൅ ቀ1߬ቁ
ఙିଵ ሺ̅ߠ௫஺ሻఙିଵିఊ቉ی
ۋ
ۊ
ଵ
ఙିଵ
			 
⟹ ்ܲ	 ൌ
ۉ
ۈ
ۇ ߣ
ߛሺߩܣሻఊ ൬ߪܫܶ൰
ఉ
ቀ݂ఉ ൅ ߬ିఊ ௫݂ఉቁی
ۋ
ۊ
ଵ
ఊ
									ሺ32ሻ 
where, as before, β = 1 െ ఊఙିଵ , ߣ ൌ ߛ െ ሺߪ െ 1ሻ, and the last equality is obtained by using (21) 
and (31). Given our assumption that ௦ܰ is sufficiently small so that subsidy-eligible firms do not 
affect income within the economy, it is straightforward to show that ܫ் ൌ ܫ ൌ ఊఊିఘ ܮ.9 Therefore, 
since ߬ିఊ ௫݂ఉ ൐ 0, the aggregate price index in the open economy is less than that under autarky, 
i.e., ்ܲ ൏ ܲ.  
To examine how SBC affects the firms’ decision to export we need to determine the ordering 
among productivity thresholds: ̅ߠௗே, ̅ߠௗெ, ̅ߠௗ஺, ̅ߠௗଵ, ̅ߠ௫஺, and ̅ߠ௫ଵ. First, the productivity threshold 
beyond which firms applying maximum effort would export is greater than the threshold for 
simply producing in a non-SBC economy, i.e., ̅ߠ௫஺ ൐ ̅ߠௗ஺ as ߬ ൐ 1	and ௫݂ ൐ ݂ in Eq. (21) and 
                                                            
9 This result was first noted by Eaton and Kortum (2005) and is also proven in, for example, di Giovanni and 
Levchenko (2009). As noted earlier, for all of our results to hold we need to assume only that ௦ܰ is sufficiently small 
so that it does not significantly affect the difference between ܫ and ܫ் rather than each of the income values 
separately. 
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Eq. (31). Second, the cut-off level of productivity for exporting without any effort, ̅ߠ௫ଵ, has the 
highest value among these productivity thresholds. Third, the cut-off level of productivity for 
non-moral hazard SBC, ̅ߠௗே, has the lowest value among these productivity thresholds. Fourth, 
the upper productivity threshold for moral hazard SBC is greater than the minimum productivity 
threshold for choosing to produce in a non-SBC economy, i.e., ̅ߠௗெ ൐ ̅ߠௗ஺, because ݏ ൐ 0. Fifth, 
the threshold for domestic production with no effort, ̅ߠௗଵ, is greater than the cut-off level of 
productivity for moral hazard SBC, ̅ߠௗெ, i.e., ̅ߠௗଵ ൐ ̅ߠௗெ because ݏ ൏ ݂ ൏ ݂ሺܣఙିଵ െ 1ሻ. 
As the following Lemma indicates, the rankings between ̅ߠௗெand ̅ߠ௫஺, and between ̅ߠௗଵ and 
̅ߠ௫஺, depend on the level of trade costs, f୶ and/or ߬.  
Lemma:  Denote an index of combined trade costs by R, ܴ ≡ ߬ ௫݂ଵ/ሺఙିଵሻ. Then,  
(i) if 	ܴ ൐ ݂ଵ/ሺఙିଵሻܣ, then ̅ߠௗே ൏ ̅ߠௗ஺ ൏ ̅ߠௗெ ൏ ̅ߠௗଵ ൏ ̅ߠ௫஺ ൏ 	 ̅ߠ௫ଵ; 
(ii) if ሺ݂ ൅ ݏሻଵ/ሺఙିଵሻ ൏ ܴ ൏ ݂ଵ/ሺఙିଵሻܣ, then ̅ߠௗே ൏ ̅ߠௗ஺ ൏ ̅ߠௗெ ൏ ̅ߠ௫஺ ൏ ̅ߠௗଵ ൏ 	 ̅ߠ௫ଵ10;  
(iii) if ܴ ൏ ሺ݂ ൅ ݏሻ1/ሺߪെ1ሻ, then ̅ߠௗே ൏ ̅ߠௗ஺ ൏ ̅ߠ௫஺ ൏ ̅ߠௗெ ൏ ̅ߠௗଵ ൏ 	 ̅ߠ௫ଵ. 
Proof. Straightforward. 
As the Lemma and the discussion before it indicate, to the extent that the thresholds in the 
Lemma have counterparts in the autarky economy, the rankings and their implications for SBC 
do not change with the introduction of trade. More interestingly, the productivity threshold, ̅ߠ௫஺, 
beyond which firms would begin to export in an economy without SBC may be above or below 
the moral hazard SBC threshold, ̅ߠௗெ, depending on the size of trade costs. As the following 
                                                            
10 Note that ݂ଵ/ሺఙିଵሻܣ ൐ ሺ݂ ൅ ݏሻଵ/ሺఙିଵሻ because  ݏ ൏ ሺܣఙିଵ െ 1ሻ݂ by assumption. 
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Proposition shows, ̅ߠ௫஺ ൏ ̅ߠௗெ implies that some firms that would have exported in a non-SBC 
economy do not do so under SBC. 
Proposition 4:  Given Pareto distribution of firm productivities and a constant subsidy, s,  
(i) if ܴ ൐ ሺ݂ ൅ ݏሻ1/ሺߪെ1ሻ , the presence of SBC has no effect on the firm’s decision to 
export; 
(ii) if ܴ ൏ ሺ݂ ൅ ݏሻ1/ሺߪെ1ሻ, the presence of SBC reduces the number of exporting firms. 
Specifically, only firms with productivities 	
ߠ ൐ ̅ߠ௫ெ ൌ 1ߩܣ ்ܲ ቆ
ߪሺݏ ൅ ݂ ൅ ௫݂ሻ
ܫ் ∙
߬ఙିଵ
߬ఙିଵ ൅ 1ቇ
ଵ
ఙିଵ ൐ 		 ̅ߠ௫஺										ሺ33ሻ 
will apply maximum effort and export; 
(iii) in the presence of international trade, fewer firms have moral hazard SBC than under 
autarky. 
We can now summarize the behavior of potentially SBC firms in the low trade cost environment 
as a function of firm productivity θ: 
(i) ߠ ൑ ̅ߠௗே : The least productive firms exit the market; 
(ii) ̅ߠௗே ൑ ߠ ൑ ̅ߠௗ஺: The low productivity firms have non-moral hazard SBC and serve 
only the domestic market; 
(iii) ̅ߠௗ஺ ൑ ߠ ൑ ̅ߠ௫ெ: The firms with intermediate productivity have moral hazard SBC 
and serve only the domestic market; 
(iv) ̅ߠ௫ெ ൑ ߠ: The most productive firms have HBC and serve both the domestic and the foreign 
market.  
 
19 
 
3.3. Comparative statics  
In this section we examine the impact of changes in trade costs, both ௫݂ and ߬, on the amount 
of subsidies paid by the government and the extent of SBC-induced inefficiency due to lower 
than maximum effort applied by the potentially SBC firms. Recall that there are Ns firms eligible 
for a subsidy. Of these, according to the Lemma and to Proposition 4, the firms that apply low 
effort and actually receive a subsidy have productivities in the ሺ̅ߠௗே, ̅ߠௗெሻ  interval if ܴ ൐
ሺ݂ ൅ ݏሻ1/ሺߪെ1ሻ and in the ሺ̅ߠௗே, ̅ߠ௫ெሻ	interval if	ܴ ൏ ሺ݂ ൅ ݏሻ1/ሺߪെ1ሻ. Therefore, the total subsidy, S, 
provided by the government is given by the following two expressions: 
ܵ ൌ ݏ ௦ܰሺܨሺ̅ߠௗெሻ െ ܨሺ̅ߠௗேሻሻ	if	ܴ ൐ ሺ݂ ൅ ݏሻ1/ሺߪെ1ሻ								ሺ34ሻ 
ܵ ൌ ݏ ௦ܰሺܨሺ̅ߠ௫ெሻ െ ܨሺ̅ߠௗேሻሻ	if	ܴ ൏ ሺ݂ ൅ ݏሻ1/ሺߪെ1ሻ								ሺ35ሻ 
The SBC-induced inefficiency due to lower than socially efficient effort (i.e., effort lower than ܣ) 
applied by the firms can be measured by:11 
ߗ ൌ ௦ܰ න ሺߨௗሺߠ, ܣሻ െ ߨௗሺߠ, ܽሻሻ݀ܨሺߠሻ
ఏഥ೏ಾ
ఏഥ೏ಲ
	if	ܴ ൐ ሺ݂ ൅ ݏሻ1/ሺߪെ1ሻ												ሺ36ሻ	 
and  	
ߗ ൌ ௦ܰ ൮ න ൫ߨௗሺߠ, ܣሻ െ ߨௗሺߠ, ܽሻ൯݀ܨሺߠሻ
ఏഥೣಲ
ఏഥ೏ಲ
൅ න ൫ߨ௫ሺߠ, ܣሻ െ ߨௗሺߠ, ܽሻ൯݀ܨሺߠሻ
ఏഥೣಾ
ఏഥೣಲ
൲			ሺ37ሻ	
																																																																																																		if	ܴ ൏ ሺ݂ ൅ ݏሻଵ/ሺఙିଵሻ												 
                                                            
11  Strictly speaking, these expressions presumably overestimate welfare loss somewhat, because on average 
additional output produced with extra effort would be less valuable than marginal output. This consideration, 
however, does not affect the comparative statics below. 
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where ܽ ൌ ଵఘఏ௉೅ ቀ
௙ఙ
ூ೅ ቁ
భ
഑షభ  and the respective profit functions are defined in (20) and (30). In 
addition, SBC generates inefficiencies by keeping afloat firms that applied maximum effort but 
would have gone out of business if not for the subsidies. This inefficiency can be measured by 
the following expression: 
ߗ଴ ൌ ௦ܰ න ൫ݏ െ ߨௗሺߠ, ܣሻ൯݀ܨሺߠሻ																										ሺ38ሻ
ఏഥ೏ಲ
ఏഥ೏ಿ
 
By differentiating expressions (34)-(38) with respect to τ and fx, we obtain the following 
Proposition. 
Proposition 5. Trade liberalization reflected in the decline of trade costs τ and fx reduces both the 
total amount of subsidy paid by the government to eligible firms and the SBC-induced 
inefficiencies as measured by (36)-(38). 
This result is obtained under the assumption of an exogenously fixed amount of subsidy to an 
individual firm. One may argue that as trade liberalization results in smaller aggregate subsidy 
and, therefore, creates some “leftover” government funds, firms may try to lobby for increasing 
the size of individual subsidy or firms that were not previously eligible for a subsidy might try to 
obtain it. Whether such lobbying is likely to succeed depends on the trade-induced changes in 
social costs and benefits of subsidies and the opportunity cost of subsidies to the government, 
among other factors. For example, trade liberalization might result in government reallocating 
some funds for export promotion, increasing the opportunity cost of supporting SBC firms. In 
this case, one distortion might reduce incentives for another distortion similarly to the 
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mechanism analyzed in Qian and Roland (1998). These issues are beyond the scope of the 
present paper and may present a fruitful direction for future research. 
4. Conclusion  
In this paper we analyze the interaction of the soft budget constraint (SBC) and international 
trade liberalization by placing Segal’s (1998) SBC model within Melitz’s (2003) framework of 
international trade with heterogeneous monopolistically competitive firms. We first examine the 
relationship between SBC and firm productivity under autarky. The least productive firms 
eligible for a subsidy have HBC and exit the market, the next tier of firms have non-moral hazard 
SBC (i.e., they apply maximum effort and receive a subsidy), the intermediate productivity firms 
have moral hazard SBC, and the most productive firms have HBC. Therefore, among potentially 
SBC firms only the intermediate productivity firms apply suboptimal effort in order to obtain a 
subsidy from government. The inefficiency generated by SBC, however, includes both the 
profits lost by firms subject to moral hazard SBC and the waste of resources by relatively low 
productivity HBC firms that are kept afloat by the subsidies. Note that by assuming that 
potentially SBC firms have higher fixed costs than other firms, the above results would imply 
that moral hazard SBC affects large firms as measured by their output. 
The possibility of international trade adds another sort of inefficiency. Some firms that would 
have become exporters in the absence of SBC choose to apply low effort and not export in order 
to extract a subsidy from the government. This effect takes place when trade costs are 
sufficiently low. Overall, however, trade liberalization reduces inefficiencies generated by SBC. 
The total amount of the subsidy and, therefore, the number of firms subject to moral hazard SBC 
decrease as trade costs decline. More important, aggregate effort level increases and aggregate 
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profits lost due to SBC-induced sub-optimal effort decline as trade costs decrease. Also, trade 
liberalization reduces social loss induced by subsidies that keep afloat firms that would have 
exited the market if no subsidies were available. 
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Appendix 
Proposition 1: For  
ߠ ൒ 	 ̅ߠଵ ൌ ଵఘ௉ ቀ
௙ఙ
ூ ቁ
భ
഑షభ,  (15) 
firms choose the maximum effort A without asking for any subsidy (HBC). 
Proof of Proposition 1 : First, note that from (12) the cut-off level of productivity for a firm that 
does not apply any effort is ̅ߠଵ ൌ ଵఘ௉ ቀ
௙ఙ
ூ ቁ
భ
഑షభ and given that A > 1,	̅ߠଵ ൐ 	 ̅ߠ஺. Hence, firms with 
ߠ ൒ 	 ̅ߠଵ will always obtain positive profits and, therefore, operate regardless of effort, i.e., for 
these firms, 0 ൑ ߨሺߠ, 1ሻ ൏ ߨሺߠ, ܣሻ.  
By backward induction, in Stage 4, the firm with ߠ ൒ 	 ̅ߠଵ will produce even without s.  
Hence, the firm’s threat not to produce without s is not credible. Therefore, in Stage 3, the 
government will reject the request to provide a subsidy. In Stage 2, the firm knows that the 
government will not accept its request; so it will not ask for a subsidy and will choose effort A in 
Stage 1 to maximize its profit without the subsidy.  Q.E.D. 
Proposition 2 (Segal, 1998):  For a firm with ̅ߠ஺ ൑ ߠ ൏ ̅ߠଵ ,  
i) If ߨሺߠ, ܣሻ ൏ ݏ , the firm chooses the cut-off level of effort ܽ଴ሺ൏ ܣሻ, receives the 
subsidy ݏ and produces (Moral hazard SBC); 
ii) If ߨሺߠ, ܣሻ ൐ ݏ, the firm chooses maximum effort A, receives no subsidy and produces 
(HBC). 
iii) If ߨሺߠ, ܣሻ ൌ ݏ, the result would be either  i) or ii). 
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Proof of Proposition 2: (i) By backward induction, if in Stage 4, ߨሺߠ, ܽሻ ൑ 0,  the firm will not 
produce without a subsidy. Therefore, in Stage 3, the government will accept the firm’s request 
to provide a subsidy if ߨሺߠ, ܽሻ ൑ 0. If, however, in Stage 4, ߨሺߠ, ܽሻ ൐ 0, the firm would produce 
even without a subsidy and in Stage 3 the government would not accept the firm’s request for a 
subsidy. Knowing this, in Stage 2, the firm will ask for ݏ if ߨሺߠ, ܽሻ ൑ 0. In Stage 1, the firm 
knows that by choosing ܽ ൑ ܽ଴	it can obtain benefit ߨሺߠ, ܽሻ ൅ ݏ ൒ ݏ  and by choosing ܽ ൌ ܣ it 
would obtain profit ሺߠ, ܣሻ ൏ ݏ . Therefore, to maximize its profit, the firm will choose ܽ଴  to 
obtain ሺߠ, ܽ଴ሻ ൅ ݏ ൌ ݏ . Effort level ܽ଴ exists because without a subsidy, and given ̅ߠ஺ ൑ ߠ ൏ ̅ߠଵ, 
the firm’s profit can be negative or non-negative depending on its effort, i.e., ߨሺߠ, 1ሻ ൏ 0 ൑
ߨሺߠ, ܣሻ. Given that π(θ,a) is continuous in a, a cut-off level of effort ܽ଴ exists and satisfies 
ߨሺߠ, ܽ଴ሻ ൌ 0: 
ߨሺߠ, ܽ଴ሻ ൌ ூሺఘఏ௔௉ሻ഑షభఙ െ ݂ ൌ 0,  
⟹ ܽ଴ሺߠሻ ൌ 	 ଵఘఏ௉ ቀ
௙ఙ
ூ ቁ
భ
഑షభ ൌ ଵఏ ̅ߠଵ.(ii) Using reasoning similar to that in (i), we find that the firm 
would choose	ܽ ൌ ܣ in order to obtain profit ߨሺߠ, ܣሻ ൐ ݏ. 
(iii) Here, the firm is indifferent between applying effort ܽ଴ and receiving s and applying effort A 
and receiving no subsidy. Therefore, either is possible.  Q.E.D. 
Proposition 3:  For a firm with ߠ ൏ ̅ߠ஺, 
i) If ߨሺߠ, ܣሻ ൅ ݏ ൒ 0, the firm chooses maximum effort ܣ, receives a subsidy of ݏ, and 
produces (Non-moral hazard SBC). 
ii) If ߨሺߠ, ܣሻ ൅ ݏ ൏ 0, the firm exits the market (HBC). 
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Proof of Proposition 3 : (i) By backward induction, in Stage 4, the firm’s threat not to produce is 
credible because ߨሺߠ, ܽሻ ൏ 0, ∀ܽ. In Stage 3, the government will accept the firm’s request for 
subsidy. Knowing this, in Stage 2, the firm will ask for a subsidy. In Stage 1, the firm’s profit is 
ߨሺߠ, ܽሻ ൅ ݏ ൑ ߨሺߠ, ܣሻ ൅ ݏ. Hence, the firm will choose A to maximize its profit.  
(ii) If ߨሺߠ, ܣሻ ൅ ݏ ൏ 0, the firm’s payoff with or without a subsidy is negative and the firm will 
exit.  Q.E.D. 
Proposition 4:  Given Pareto distribution of firm productivities and a constant subsidy, s,  
(i) if ܴ ൐ ሺ݂ ൅ ݏሻ1/ሺߪെ1ሻ , the presence of SBC has no effect on the firm’s decision to 
export; 
(ii) if ܴ ൏ ሺ݂ ൅ ݏሻ1/ሺߪെ1ሻ, the presence of SBC reduces the number of exporting firms. 
Specifically, only firms with productivities 	
ߠ ൐ ̅ߠ௫ெ ൌ 1ߩܣ ்ܲ ቆ
ߪሺݏ ൅ ݂ ൅ ௫݂ሻ
ܫ ∙
߬ఙିଵ
߬ఙିଵ ൅ 1ቇ
ଵ
ఙିଵ ൐ 		 ̅ߠ௫஺										ሺ33ሻ 
will apply maximum effort and export; 
(iii) in the presence of international trade, fewer firms have moral hazard SBC than under 
autarky. 
Proof of Proposition 4:  
(i) follows directly from the fact that for ܴ ൐ ሺ݂ ൅ ݏሻ1/ሺߪെ1ሻ , ̅ߠௗெ ൏ ̅ߠ௫஺ ,  (see the 
Lemma). 
(ii) If ܴ ൏ ሺ݂ ൅ ݏሻ1/ሺߪെ1ሻ,  then ̅ߠ௫஺ ൏ ̅ߠௗெ  and, therefore, firms with productivities 
̅ߠ௫஺ ൏ ߠ ൏ ̅ߠௗெ  that are eligible for a subsidy would choose to apply effort ܽௗ଴  < 
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A, such that ߨௗሺߠ, ܽௗ଴ሻ ൌ 0, receive the subsidy and produce only in the domestic 
market (moral hazard SBC). Threshold (33) in the Proposition is obtained from 
solving the equation ߨ்ሺ̅ߠ௫ெ, ܣሻ ൌ ߨௗሺ̅ߠ௫ெ, ܣሻ ൅ ߨ௫ሺ̅ߠ௫ெ, ܣሻ ൌ ݏ with respect to 
̅ߠ௫ெ. In the absence of SBC, all firms with ߠ ൐ ̅ߠ௫஺ would have applied effort A 
and produced both for the domestic market and for export. 
(iii) Recall that the number of potentially SBC firms is denoted by Ns. Under autarky, 
the expected number of moral hazard SBC firms equals  ௦ܰሺܨሺ̅ߠெሻ െ ܨሺ̅ߠ஺ሻሻ, 
where ܨሺ. ሻ  represents cumulative distribution function of SBC firms’ 
productivities. With trade, the expected number of moral hazard SBC firms is 
given by ௦ܰሺܯ݅݊ሼܨሺ̅ߠௗெሻ, ܨሺ̅ߠ௫ெሻሽ െ ܨሺ̅ߠௗ஺ሻሻ . Suppose first that ̅ߠௗெ ൑ 	 ̅ߠ௫ெ. 
Given Pareto distribution of firm productivities and that thresholds 
̅ߠௗெ	and	̅ߠெ	and		̅ߠௗ஺	and	̅ߠ஺  differ only by the inverse of the respective 
aggregate price indices, the sign of ܨሺ̅ߠௗெሻ െ ܨሺ̅ߠௗ஺ሻ െ ሺܨሺ̅ߠெሻ െ ܨሺ̅ߠ஺ሻሻ is the 
same, as the sign of ்ܲఊ െ ܲఊ ൏ 0  . If ̅ߠௗெ ൐ 	 ̅ߠ௫ெ , then  ܨሺ̅ߠௗெሻ ൐ ܨሺ̅ߠ௫ெሻ 
implying that ܨሺ̅ߠ௫ெሻ െ ܨሺ̅ߠௗ஺ሻ െ ሺܨሺ̅ߠெሻ െ ܨሺ̅ߠ஺ሻሻ is also negative. Q.E.D. 
Proposition 5. Trade liberalization reflected in the decline of trade costs τ and fx reduces both the 
total amount of subsidy paid by the government to eligible firms and the SBC-induced 
inefficiency. 
Proof. First, note that the expression for PT in (32) implies that  
డ௉೅
డఛ ൐ 0 and  
డ௉೅
డ௙ೣ ൐ 0. Also, 
from (24), డఏ
ഥ೏ಾ
డఛ ൌ
ିଵ
ఘ஺௉೅మ
ቂఙሺ௙ା௦ሻூ ቃ
భ
഑షభ డ௉೅
డఛ  and from (25), 
డఏഥ೏ಿ
డఛ ൌ
ିଵ
ఘ஺௉೅మ
ቂఙሺ௙ି௦ሻூ ቃ
భ
഑షభ డ௉೅
డఛ .		 (Note that 
under our assumptions, ܫ் ൌ ܫ	for all values of ߬ and ௫݂  and, therefore, డூ೅డఛ ൌ
డூ೅
డ௙ೣ ൌ 0.) Similarly, 
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డఏഥ೏ಾ
డ௙ೣ ൌ
ିଵ
ఘ஺௉೅మ
ቂఙሺ௙ା௦ሻூ ቃ
భ
഑షభ డ௉೅
డ௙ೣ  and 
డఏഥ೏ಿ
డ௙ೣ ൌ
ିଵ
ఘ஺௉೅మ
ቂఙሺ௙ି௦ሻூ ቃ
భ
഑షభ డ௉೅
డ௙ೣ . From these expressions and using 
(34), it is straightforward to show that for ܴ ൐ ሺ݂ ൅ ݏሻ1/ሺߪെ1ሻ, the signs of  డௌడఛ 	and	
డௌ
డ௙ೣ 	are the 
same as the sign of ቀሾ݂ ൅ ݏሿ షം഑షభ െ ሾ݂ െ ݏሿ షം഑షభቁ ቀെ డ௉೅డ௭ ቁ,where z stands either for τ or for fx. 
Therefore,  డௌడఛ ൐ 0	and	
డௌ
డ௙ೣ ൐ 0. If ܴ ൏ ሺ݂ ൅ ݏሻ1/ሺߪെ1ሻ , we need to replace ̅ߠௗெ  with ̅ߠ௫ெ in the 
above calculations.  Specifically, డఏ
ഥೣಾ
డఛ ൌ
డఏഥೣಾ
డఛ ൅
డఏഥೣಾ
డ௉೅
డ௉೅
డఛ ൐
డఏഥೣಾ
డ௉೅
డ௉೅
డఛ 	  and  
డఏഥೣಾ
డ௙ೣ ൌ
డఏഥೣಾ
డ௙ೣ ൅
డఏഥೣಾ
డ௉೅
డ௉೅
డ௙ೣ ൐
డఏഥೣಾ
డ௉೅
డ௉೅
డ௙ೣ  . Therefore, the signs of 
డௌ
డఛ 	and	
డௌ
డ௙ೣ   are the same as  
ቌቈሺ݂ ൅ ௫݂ ൅ ݏሻ ߬
ఙିଵ
߬ఙିଵ ൅ 1቉
ିఊ
ఙିଵ െ ሾ݂ െ ݏሿ ିఊఙିଵቍ ൬െ߲ ்߲ܲݖ ൰,												ሺ39ሻ 
where z again stands either for τ or for fx. Note that expression  ఛ഑షభఛ഑షభାଵ	reaches its minimum 
feasible value of ½ when τ = 1. Also, because ௫݂ ൐ ݂, expression (39) is greater than ቀሾሺ2݂ ൅
ݏሻ/2ሿ షം഑షభ െ ሾ݂ െ ݏሿ షം഑షభቁ ቀെ డ௉೅డ௭ ቁ ൐ 0 . That is, the total amount of subsidy paid by the 
government diminishes as trade costs decline. 
We now turn to comparative statics of the aggregate inefficiency induced SBC. Consider first డఆడ௭  
for ܴ ൐ ሺ݂ ൅ ݏሻ1/ሺߪെ1ሻ. Because డ௉೅డ௭ ൐ 0, the sign of this derivative is the same as the sign of the 
derivative of the integral from (36). This integral is: 
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න ൫ߨௗሺߠ, ܣሻ െ ߨௗሺߠ, ܽሻ൯݀ܨሺߠሻ
ఏഥ೏ಾ
ఏഥ೏ಲ
ൌ ܫߪߚ ሺߩ ்ܲܣሻ
ఊ ൬ܪଵߚቀܪଶఉିଵ െ ܪଵఉିଵቁ ൅ ሺ1 െ ߚሻቀܪଶఉ െ ܪଵఉቁ൰,													ሺ40ሻ												 
where ܪଵ ൌ ఙ௙ூ , ܪଶ ൌ
ఙሺ௙ା௦ሻ
ூ 	and, as	before, ߚ ൌ 1 െ
ఊ
ఙିଵ. Its derivative with respect to ்ܲ	is: 
ߛܫሺߩ ்ܲܣሻఊ
ߪ ்ܲߚ ቀߚܪଶ
ఉିଵܪଵ ൅ ሺ1 െ ߚሻܪଶఉ െ ܪଵఉቁ.				ሺ41ሻ 
Because ߚ ൏ 0 the sign of (41) is opposite to the sign of the expression in the large parentheses. 
Using the expressions for ܪଵ, ܪଶ, and	ߚ, the expression in the parentheses can be rewritten as 
ቀఙூቁ
ఉ ቆቀ݂ ൅ ఊ௦ఙିଵቁ ሺ݂ ൅ ݏሻି
ം
഑షభ െ ݂ଵି ം഑షభቇ ൏ ቀఙூቁ
ఉ ቆቀ݂ ൅ ఊ௙ఙିଵቁ ሺ݂ ൅ ݂ሻି
ം
഑షభ െ ݂ଵି ം഑షభቇ ൌ
ቀఙூቁ
ఉ ቀ2 షം഑షభ ቀ1 ൅ ఊఙିଵቁ ݂ଵି
ം
഑షభ െ ݂ଵି ം഑షభቁ ൌ ቀఙ௙ூ ቁ
ఉ 2 షം഑షభ ቀ1 ൅ ఊఙିଵ െ 2
ം
഑షభቁ										ሺ42ሻ   
The last parentheses in (42) are negative. This is because the expression in the parentheses is 
maximized at the lowest feasible value of  ఊఙିଵ>1 and at the point where 
ఊ
ఙିଵ ൌ 1	the parentheses 
are zero. Therefore, expression (41) is positive and given that డ௉೅డ௭ ൐ 0, we obtain that when 
ܴ ൐ ሺ݂ ൅ ݏሻ1/ሺߪെ1ሻ	,	efficiency increases as trade costs fall.  
  
We now turn to the case of ܴ ൏ ሺ݂ ൅ ݏሻ1/ሺߪെ1ሻ.	 Denote 
ߗଵ ൌ න ൫ߨௗሺߠ, ܣሻ െ ߨௗሺߠ, ܽሻ൯݀ܨሺߠሻ
ఏഥೣಲ
ఏഥ೏ಲ
	and 
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ߗଶ ൌ න ൫ߨ௫ሺߠ, ܣሻ െ ߨௗሺߠ, ܽሻ൯݀ܨሺߠሻ
ఏഥೣಾ
ఏഥೣಲ
																		ሺ43ሻ	 
(We do not include ௦ܰ  in these expressions because it is not going to affect the sign of the 
derivatives.) We will first show that డఆభడ௭ ൌ
డఆభ
డ௭ ൅
డఆభ
డ௉೅
డ௉೅
డ௭ ൐ 0  and then we will show that 
డఆమ
డ௭ ൌ
డఆమ
డ௭ ൅
డఆమ
డ௉೅
డ௉೅
డ௭ ൐ 0	 (where, as before, z stands either for τ or for fx). Consider first 
డఆభ
డ௉೅.	Similarly to (41), this derivative reduces to the following expression: 
ߛܫሺߩ ்ܲܣሻఊ
ߪ ்ܲߚ ൬ܪଵߚቀ߬
ିఊܪଷఉିଵ െ ܪଵఉିଵቁ ൅ ሺ1 െ ߚሻቀ߬ିఊܪଷఉ െ ܪଵఉቁ൰,										ሺ44ሻ 
where ܪଵ	and	ߚ	were	defined	before	and	ܪଷ ൌ ఙ௙ೣூ . Again, the sign of (44) is opposite to the 
sign of the large parentheses. The latter can be written as 
ቀߪܫቁ
ఉ ൬߬ିఊቀ݂ߚ ௫݂ఉିଵ ൅ ሺ1 െ ߚሻ ௫݂ఉ െ ݂ఉ߬ఊቁ൰ ൏ ቀߪܫቁ
ఉ ቀ݂ߚ ௫݂ఉିଵ ൅ ሺ1 െ ߚሻ ௫݂ఉ െ ݂ఉ߬ఊቁ.				ሺ45ሻ 
The derivative of the latter expression with respect to ௫݂	 is negative, implying that this 
expression reaches its maximum at the lowest feasible value of ௫݂ ൌ ݂. At this point the right 
hand side of (44) is zero, implying that for all ௫݂ ൐ ݂the right hand side of (45) is negative and, 
therefore, డఆభడ௉೅ ൐ 0. Consider next 
డఆభ
డఛ : 
߲ߗଵ
߲߬ ൌ
ߛܫሺߩ ்ܲܣሻఊ
ߪ߬ଵାఊ ܪଷ
ఉሺ߬ െ ܪଵܪଷି ଵሻ ൐ 0 
It is similarly straightforward to show that డఆభడ௙ೣ ൐ 0. Therefore, 
డఆభ
డ௭ ൌ
డఆభ
డ௭ ൅
డఆభ
డ௉೅
డ௉೅
డ௭ ൐ 0. 
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Now we turn to డఆమడ௭ ൌ
డఆమ
డ௭ ൅
డఆమ
డ௉೅
డ௉೅
డ௭ . Consider first 
డఆమ
డ௉೅. It can be simplified to 
߲ߗଶ
߲ ்ܲ ൌ
ߛܫሺߩ ்ܲܣሻఊ
ߪ ்ܲߚ ൬െߚܪଷቀ߬
ିఊܪଷఉିଵ െ ܪସఉିଵቁ െ ሺ1 െ ߚሻቀ߬ିఊܪଷఉ െ ܪସఉ߬ିሺఙିଵሻቁ൰
ൌ 				 ߛܫሺߩ ்ܲܣሻ
ఊ
ߪ ்ܲߚ ቀߚܪଷܪସ
ఉିଵ െ ߬ିఊܪଷఉ ൅ ሺ1 െ ߚሻܪସఉ߬ିሺఙିଵሻቁ													ሺ46ሻ 
where ܪସ ൌ ఙሺ௦ା௙ା௙ೣ ሻூ ∙
ఛ഑షభ
ఛ഑షభାଵ.  Notice that ܴ ൌ ߬ ௫݂
1/ሺߪെ1ሻ ൏ ሺ݂ ൅ ݏሻ1/ሺߪെ1ሻ   implies that ܪସ ൐
ఙ൫ఛ഑షభ௙ೣ ା௙ೣ ൯
ூ ∙
ఛ഑షభ
ఛ഑షభାଵ ൌ ܪଷ߬ఙିଵ  or 
ுయ
ுర ൏ ߬
ିሺఙିଵሻ.  Denote the expression the last parentheses in 
(46) by ܩ ൌ ߚܪଷܪସఉିଵ െ ߬ିఊܪଷఉ ൅ ሺ1 െ ߚሻܪସఉ߬ିሺఙିଵሻ. Notice that  
߲ܩ
߲ܪସ ൌ ߚሺߚ െ 1ሻܪସ
ఉିଵ ൬ܪଷܪସ െ ߬
ିሺఙିଵሻ൰ ൏ 0.																																		ሺ47ሻ 
 Therefore, if we replace ܪସ in ܩ with ܪଷ߬ఙିଵ, the resulting expression will be greater than ܩ: 
ܩ ൏ ߚܪଷሺܪଷ߬ఙିଵሻఉିଵ െ ߬ିఊܪଷఉ ൅ ሺ1 െ ߚሻሺܪଷ߬ఙିଵሻఉ߬ିሺఙିଵሻ ൌ ߬ିఊܪଷఉ െ ߬ିఊܪଷఉ ൌ 0. 
This demonstrates that ܩ  is negative and, therefore, (46) is positive. In order to show that 
డఆభ
డఛ ൐ 0, we will show that each term in 
డఆమ
డఛ ൌ
డఆమ
డఛ ൅
డఆమ
డுర
డுర
డఛ  is positive. First note:  
߲ߗଶ
߲߬ ൌ
ߛܫሺߩ ்ܲܣሻఊ
ߪ ்ܲߚ ቀߚ߬
ିఊܪଷఉ െ ߚܪସఉ߬ିሺఙିଵሻቁ ൌ
ߛܫሺߩ ்ܲܣሻఊ
ߪ ்ܲ ቀ߬
ିఊܪଷఉ െ ܪସఉ߬ିሺఙିଵሻቁ ൐ 0 
Also, డఆమ	డுర ൌ
ሺఉିଵሻூሺఘ௉೅஺ሻം
ఙுర ቀܪଷܪସ
ఉିଵ െ ܪସఉ߬ିሺఙିଵሻቁ ൌ ሺଵିఉሻூሺఘ௉೅஺ሻ
ം
ఙுరభషഁ
ቀ߬ିሺఙିଵሻ െ ுయுరቁ ൐ 0 . In 
addition, it is straightforward to show that డுరడఛ ൐ 0.Using similar approach, we can easily show 
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that డఆమడ௙ೣ ൐ 0. The above arguments establish that both integrals in (43) and, therefore, expression 
(37) decline as trade costs decrease. 
 Finally, we need to demonstrate that డఆబడ௭ ൐ 0, where ߗ଴ is given in (38). Note that ߗ଴  
depends on ݖ only via ்ܲ  . Therefore, all we need to show is that డఆబడ௉೅ ൐ 0. This can be done 
through already familiar steps. Denote ܪହ ൌ ௦ఙூ  and ܪ଺ ൌ
ሺ௙ି௦ሻఙ
ூ , and note that ܪ଺ ൏ ܪଵ. Then, 
߲ߗ଴
߲ ்ܲ ൌ
ߛܫሺߩ ்ܲܣሻఊ
ߪ ்ܲߚ ቀߚܪହܪ଺
ఉିଵ െ ߚܪହܪଵఉିଵ െ ܪଵఉ ൅ ߚܪଵܪ଺ఉିଵ ൅ ሺ1 െ ߚሻܪ଺ఉቁ
ൌ ߛܫሺߩ ்ܲܣሻ
ఊ
ߪ ்ܲߚ ቀߚܪହሺܪ଺
ఉିଵ െ ܪଵఉିଵሻ െ ܪଵఉ ൅ ߚܪଵܪ଺ఉିଵ ൅ ሺ1 െ ߚሻܪ଺ఉቁ								ሺ48ሻ 
In the above expression, the fraction in front of the parentheses is negative. Also, the derivative 
of the expression in the parentheses with respect to ܪଵis: 
െߚଶܪହܪଵఉିଶ ൅ ߚܪହܪଵఉିଶ െ ߚቀܪଵఉିଵ െ ܪ଺ఉିଵቁ.																																			ሺ49ሻ 
The first two terms in (49) are negative and the expression in the parentheses in the last term is 
negative, because ܪଵ ൐ ܪ଺.  Therefore, the derivative of (48) with respect to ܪଵ  is negative, 
implying that its maximum value is reached at the minimum feasible value of ܪଵ. Replacing ܪଵ 
in (48) with ܪ଺, we obtain: 
ߚܪହሺܪ଺ఉିଵ െ ܪଵఉିଵሻ െ ܪଵఉ ൅ ߚܪଵܪ଺ఉିଵ ൅ ሺ1 െ ߚሻܪ଺ఉ ൏ െܪ଺ఉ ൅ ߚܪ଺ఉ ൅ ሺ1 െ ߚሻܪ଺ఉ
ൌ 0.													ሺ50ሻ 
Therefore, డఆబడ௉೅ ൐ 0.  
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Thus, we have demonstrated that (36), (37), and (38) decrease as trade costs decline. Therefore, 
trade liberalization reduces inefficiency generated by SBC. Q.E.D. 
